


Above: Hs 293 in the German Museum in Munich. Bottom:

Versions of the Henschel He 293 remote-controlled glide bomb (A, C3, C4 and D). Stupidity or sabotage in the Luftwaffe ensured that thousands of these precision weapons were scrapped unused in the summer of 1944.



However, those responsible in the Luftwaffe command saw to it that the FC stockpile was distributed to depots from Norway to southern France because of the 'everywhere possible threat of invasion' and that the commanders of the theaters of war were informed about this new weapon, which was within their area, apart from other airdrop weapons. stored for an operation were not allowed to be informed. This seems all the more absurd since the Allies had already caught FX and HS 293s still packed in crates on September 27, 1943 when they took over the air force park in Foggia (southern Italy). The probably true reason: Field Marshals VON RUNDSTEDT and ROMMEL could otherwise have had dangerous ideas for the plans of General EISENHOWER's helpers and could have ordered the use of the precision weapons in their area of command.

Guided Bomb

FX: Successful sinkings were hidden from the top Luftwaffe command. (German Museum, Munich)



In the run-up to the landing, ›someone‹ had also made sure that most of the aircraft, which were fully equipped to drop the FX or HS 293 guided bombs, were converted for retaliatory attacks on London, so that in the summer of 1944 it was no longer even possible to provide only training aircraft to the Luftwaffe units that were still deployed with the precision weapons.

Although around 4,000 FK were manufactured, the guided missiles at the operational airfields remained in short supply. The KG 100, which bore the brunt of the FK operation, had just over 79 loaded FK from August 1 to 10, 1944.

The fact remains that the Germans had about as many precision weapons at their disposal as the USA had in the first Gulf War. Only, unlike the Americans, they rarely used them against their opponents.

Although on August 4, 1944 a Do 217 of KG 100 with one of the few deployed HS 293s had succeeded in destroying the important bridge at Pontaubault with a single hit of a glide bomb during the night, Hermann GÖRING ordered shortly thereafter that »any further work with the to stop remote-controlled bodies immediately and to destroy ready-made weapons«. It is likely that GÖRING was not informed that the hit by HS 293 briefly stopped the advance of the 6th US Panzer Division, which was so disastrous for the

German defenders

1 Ulf BALKE,
Kampfgeschwader 100
"Wiking", Motorbuch,
Stuttgart 1981 pp. 245-251 and 308 f.

In their desperation at this absurd order, a group of Rechlin engineers turned to Reichsführer SS Heinrich HIMMLER on August 15, 1944 to point out the "perhaps war-decisive importance of this new weapon." They came too late, because most of the remote-controlled bodies had already been scrapped or blown up by then. Isn't it striking how quickly GÖRING's orders were obeyed in this case ?¹

The well-informed Colonel BAUMBACH gave in his book *Too Late?* High-ranking people in GÖRING 's environment are then also to blame for not having informed the Reich Marshal too late or incorrectly about the FK and other (!) promising weapons.

In response to post-war justifications for their sabotage-like failure to largely withhold these existing superior technical capabilities from the Luftwaffe, the integrity of the last Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, General KOLLER, replied: "Hence not procuring suitable aircraft and getting rid of the remotely guided bombs?" The Luftwaffe was in summer In 1944 a 'push button war' against the Allied ships off Normandy had been technically possible.

¹ Small remnants of the FK were kept in reserve as carriers for gas warfare agents or used against land targets again in the spring of 1945 after a bitter dispute about 'secrecy' (the enemy had known the weapon since)

It never took place because those responsible in the Air Force did not want it.

Lightning bombers over Normandy

On Saturday, April 1, 1944, HITLER Field Marshal ROMMEL promised a thousand Messerschmitt Me 262 turbo fighters as support for defensive combat. When the Allies landed on the Normandy coast on June 6, 1944, not a single one of these wonder planes appeared over the beaches. What happened?

The story of the revolutionary Messerschmitt Me 262 jet aircraft was arguably one of the greatest tragedies of the German Luftwaffe in World War II. Microfilm excerpts released by the USAF in 2001 prove that research on jet engines was being carried out in Germany as early as 1922, and by 1938 the work had reached such a stage that the RLM (Reich Air Ministry) commissioned the Messerschmitt project office to create a two-jet jet fighter the designation P1065, from which the later Me 262 emerged. An almost unbelievable chain of omissions, mistakes and human error meant that the Me 262 first flew in July 1942 and again two years later, in July 1944, with the Luftwaffe

came to the front. On March 4, 1943, Protocol No. 9 had mentioned a Fuehrer order that in future every German fighter should also be able to serve in the fighter-bomber role.

It specifically referred to the Me 262. After that, an installation was planned, which provided for the transport of a 500 kg bomb load for the jet fighter according to drawing no. II/141.

The standard Jäger-Revi (reflex sight) should be used for this. For this fighter-bomber operation, the main landing gear tires were to be increased from 770x270 to 840x300. As early as May 26, 1943, the Messerschmitt company had accordingly developed the first project for a fighter-bomber for the Me 262, from which three "fast bomber projects" arose by the summer of 1943. At that time there was no connection to defense against invasion, since the war situation was still more favorable for Germany, and also on June 7, 1943, when MESSERSCHMITT spoke to HITLER in the Führer's headquarters, Willy MESSERSCHMITT had suggested the Me 262 as a fast bomber for the attack on the British Isles. He knew that this was an affair of the heart of the Führer.^{1, 2}

¹ Jeffrey ETHELL & Alfred PRICE, *The German Jets in Combat*, Janes 1979, pp. 20-27.

² J.Richard SMITH & Eddie J. CREEK, *Me 262*, Vol. 1, Classic, revised Edition 2001, pp. 149 fu 182-189.

In the meantime, the notorious 'Messerschmitt effect' (dissipation, delays, false promises) had set in, and GÖRING began to wonder whether the much-vaunted jet fighter would ever be used. When he told Adolf HITLER this on October 27, 1943, "HITLER almost had a stroke, according to GÖRING ." That's how important the jet bomber had become for defense against invasion! HITLER hoped the Me 262 would play a crucial role in crushing the Allied invasion of France the following spring. (It was therefore already clear to everyone at that time where the Allied invasion would take place – author's note.) HITLER GÖRING described the first hours of confusion when unloading on the beach as the critical phase of the impending invasion, when everything was filled with tanks, guns and troops was blocked: The fast Me 262 had to make its sensational appearance during these hours, namely as a fast bomber! Precise targeting is not required - it would be enough if the planes could zoom low over the beach landing pads, hurling bombs at the troops disembarking in full gear and forcing them to duck their heads; even a few hours' delay imposed on the enemy could be decisive, for that would give him the necessary time to draw up his own reserves. GÖRING agreed, but overall he had doubts after David IRVING's Wor

They kept in mind that the Me 262 would be operational by that time. That is why he now said that one would also try to use this tactic with the existing fighter-bombers. HITLER would have added: "If we could only take two 70s (70 kg bombs, which didn't exist) with us, I'd be extremely grateful. " demonstrated. When HITLER was shown the Me 262 jet fighter, he asked his famous question whether this fighter could also carry bombs. Before the others could stop him, Willy MESSERSCHMITT stepped forward and declared: "Yes, my Führer, he can easily take 1000 kg or two 500 kg bombs with him." HITLER thanked him: "This is finally the Blitzbomber, this is finally the aircraft, which I have been demanding from the Luftwaffe armament for years. Here it is, but no one recognized it!"

On December 5, 1943, HITLER's order was again specified to GÖRING by his Air Force adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel Nicolaus VON BELOW . It pointed out that the greatest possible importance must be attached to the production of these aircraft for use as fighter-bombers. It was essential that the Luftwaffe had a number of jet fighter bombers ready for use at the front in the spring of 1944. Any difficulties arising from shortages of labor or raw materials would be resolved through the use of Air Force reserves until all existing shortages were met. The Fuehrer ordered that written reports be drawn up for him at two-month intervals, giving him information on the progress of the Me 262 and Ar 234 programs. The first was due on November 15, 1943. The Ar 234 jet bomber and the fast piston engine fighter-bomber Do 335 were also to be used as "lightning bombers" against the expected landing. The Me 262 was the most advanced of all three types.

On December 20, 1943, HITLER spoke again to a war conference of senior officers: "Every month that goes by makes it more likely that we will get at least one squadron of jet planes - the most important thing about it is that they [the enemy] get some bombs on their heads the moment they attempt their invasion. This will cause them to take cover and even if there is even one such plane in the air they will still need to take cover and in this way they will waste hour after hour!"

But after half a day our reserves will already be on their way. If we succeed in nailing them to the beaches for even 6-8 hours, they will see what this will mean for us. « HITLER did not rest and spoke to Field Marshal MILCH and Reich Minister SPEER about it again on January 16, 1944 that as many Me 262 as possible should be made available in the shortest possible time.

As part of the preparations for converting the Me 262 to the fighter-bomber role, experienced bomber pilot Colonel Dietrich Peltz flew the Me 262 V-6 on December 20, 1943. A strange curtain then fell on the Me 262 fighter-bomber program, despite the clear and unambiguous instructions HITLERS , the Me 262 was only released as a pure fighter. As early as December 15, 1943, the "Erprobungskommando 262" was set up at Lechfeld airfield, the first fighter unit to test the jet fighter in the interceptor role. When production of the first 22 pre-series Me 262 S1-S22 began in Leipheim in January 1944, the completed machines did not go to a fighter-bomber test unit, but only to the pure fighter pilot "Erprobungskommando 262".

On May 23, 1944, Adolf discovered HITLER at a conference GÖRING, MILCH, SPEER, SAUER and several other aircraft specialists at the Obersalzberg that so far not a single Me 262 had been manufactured as a jet bomber. Field Marshal MILCH, who dared to contradict HITLER most violently and pointed out the suitability of the Me 262 as a fighter, was ultimately taken as a scapegoat and deposed. But who was really responsible for the months of non-observance of HITLER's clear instructions is still unknown.¹

¹ David IRVING, *The Tragedy of the German Air Force. From the files and memories of Field Marshal Milch*, Ullstein, Berlin 1970, p. 326 ff. u, 360 ff.

Now, in a desperate act, attempts were made to make up for lost time before the Allied landings in France. As early as May 27, 1944, the first Me 262 flew with a 250 kg bomb. The existing Me 262s were taken away from the "Erprobungskommando 262" and handed over to the Bomber General. It was strange that the necessary wiring in the fuselage for transporting bombs had not even been installed in the factory on these pre-series aircraft, as was usual with all German Luftwaffe fighter planes. It then turned out that only a few changes were needed to make the Me 262 a fighter-bomber. Part of the armor was removed, a 600 liter tank in the

rear fuselage and, on some machines, removed two of the 30mm MK 108 cannons. The most important change was the installation of two bomb carriers of the type ETC 504 or ›Viking ship‹. The "anti-invasion aircraft" were to be armed with one 500 kg bomb or two 250 kg bombs. Drop containers of type AB 250 were intended specifically to combat the landing troops. A floating mine was specially developed to protect against landing craft and other ship targets, which went by the designation ›TM 50‹. The Me 262 could carry two bundles of four TM-50s each on their launchers. In the water, they were connected to each other and to a sea anchor by 50-meter-long floating cables. This gave a track width of 150 meters. The amount of explosives of 7 to 8 kg was enough to damage a Landing Ship with a displacement of 250 tons so badly that it sank.

Normal SC-250 mine bombs were also retrofitted with modern AD-103 fuses and could thus be used as sea mines.

Another bomb to combat DropShips from the Me 262 was the SD-500 Br.1 brake parachute bomb

The suitability of the Me 262 as a fighter-bomber at low altitudes for horizontal and shallow dive attacks turned out very quickly.

However, HITLER was also convinced that the jet bomber would be able to attack area targets from a height of a few thousand meters². As targets he thought of troop embarkation movements across the English Channel, or the mass of tanks and troops that would flood the landing beaches after disembarkation.

For this purpose, a so-called 'makeshift bomber' was to be built. However, the two-seater machine, which required a modification of the fuselage for a second operator (bombardier) in the bow, still needed several months to complete.

Only two of these were made by the end of the war.² While this special version was too late for the Normandy mission, some standard Me 262 fighter-bombers were actually still used in the Battle of France.

After the Allied landing on June 6, 1944, the Schenck Test Command, which included pilots from KG 51, began training on June 20, 1944.³ The hasty conversion to the new jet aircraft took about a month, and on July 20 In 1944 the unit moved to Châteaudun near Orleans with nine aircraft - far too far away for operations over Normandy

¹ Wolfgang FLEISCHER, *German dropping ammunition until 1945*, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 2003, pp. 148-151 and 153 f.

² Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Victory Weapons*, Vol. 2: *Star Wars 1947*, Amun Schleusen 2003, pp. 10-16

³ The well-informed Allies knew that a new weapon was being tested in Lechfeld.

So GALLAND wrote of an air

attack on the square where alone 60 Me 262 vom

Erprobungskommando and KG 51 on the ground zer

disturbed or damaged.


(Wolfgang DIERICH, *Kampfgeschwader 51 Edelweiß*, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 1975, p. 229)

The world's first jet bomber was in France with the Schenck command from the end of July 1944: it had been delayed for months beforehand, because it was supposed to be on standby against a 'second invasion' in the Pas de Calais. Not a single machine appeared over the Normandy sky.

Figure A) Me 262 A 2a/U1, Ekdo Schenk, im Bomber camouflage RLM 70/71/65

Figure B) Me 262 A 2a/U1, commander aircraft of Major Wolfgang SCHENK, alternatives

Jabo/Hunter camouflage scheme RLM 74/75/76



being able to fly the Me 262. This was no coincidence! At this point, many German military commanders still thought that the Normandy landings were just a ploy to lure German forces away from the 'main landing' at the Pas-de-Calais, which could take place at any moment. If this second invasion had taken place, the "Schenck" commando would have been ready to take action against it. However, it was never to come to that, and so the Me 262 fighter-bombers began isolated operations against the Allied ground forces that had already broken through, but these were not even noticed by them, since the attacks took place from an altitude of 4000 m without bomb sights. This earned the KG 51 the nickname "Flurschadengeschwader" and it was only later, when the order was relaxed and the machines were allowed to attack from lower altitudes, that the Me 262 developed into a successful fighter-bomber.¹ It is clear that von December 1943 to May 1944, contrary to orders from the highest authority, no work was carried out on the fighter-bomber version of the Me 262. Otherwise at least a small experimental squadron would have been ready to land in time.

No effort had been spared in producing special bombs suitable for untargeted dropping by high-performance aircraft against landing craft. Everything was free!


If only HITLER's thwarted Blitzbomber had turned around when it was deployed at the right time over the beaches of Normandy on June 6, 1944

¹ Wolfgang DIERICH, *Kampfgeschwader 51 Edelweiß*, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 1975, pp. 228-231.

can bring about? Considering the situation on Omaha Beach, there can be little doubt that a few jet fighter bombers could have tipped the scales in favor of the German defenders.¹ So did the refusal to build the Me 262 as fighter-bombers, too contributed to the loss of the Battle of Normandy? However, it must be borne in mind here that even if a handful of Me 262 Blitz bombers had been available in time, 'strange circumstances' would have delayed or prevented their deployment.


Never used anti-invasion weapons for the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet bomber

Weapons for the Blitzbomber I



SD 500 Br parachute
braking bomb for the
Dropped by high-speed
machines from an altitude of
50 m

TM 50: Bundle propellant mine
against landing craft




Blitz Bomber II

The Me 262 A 2a/U2 'makeshift bomber', which was further developed from the Me 262 A-2a fighter-bomber, was the subject of bitter discussions between HITLER and Field Marshal MILCH.

As the carrier of the German 'isotope bombs', the Me 262 A-2a/U2 could have rendered the invasion beaches unusable.

It never went into series production.



SECRET
 HEADQUARTERS
 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
 UNITED STATES ARMY
 ALSOS MISSION
 APO 887

24 April 1945


SUBJECT: Request for Samples of Enemy Bombs with Tubular Projections from Nose

TO : Scientific Chief, Alsos Mission

1. In addition to the bomb with tail antenna, requested in my memo to you dated 22 April 1945, I desire samples of two other types of bombs with projections from the nose. Remarks in paragraph 1 of that report apply to these two types also.

2. It may be noted, further, that all three types of bombs have two rectangular depressions in the walls of the main body, which may help in recognizing the bombs as the desired types. One is near the nose, the other near the base of the bomb.

3. One type will have an aluminum tube projecting straight out from the nose. This tube will be about 25 cm long, and about 4 to 6 cm in diameter and the end will be roughly spherical in shape, with the head somewhat flattened. The sphere will be about 6 - 7 cm in diameter and will have 3 openings covered by wire gauze, one opening at the head, two on either side of the sphere. The appearance of the bomb is, roughly, as follows, viewed from the side.



The portions of the head drawn with heavy pencil, indicate orifices covered with wire gauze.

4. The mechanism inside this tube is the essential part together with its connections to other parts of the bomb. The connections will possibly be cables through to the rear of the main body of the bomb, that is, to the region marked "space for chassis" in the diagram of the antenna-bomb. It is possible that a similar chassis will be found in this space for the nose-bomb too. This will be important to have.

- 1 -

SECRET

From the end of April 1945, the ALSOS mission in Germany

was desperately looking for 3 types of 'aerial bombs'. Only a short time before, a German

defector had put a prototype of the Me 262 A-2a/U2 into the hands of the USA. It has never been known whether the ALSOS found prototypes of the German "isotope bomb"

V-1: Deadly threat to the invasion

On June 12, 1944, the use of the V-1 by insiders of the enemy was addressed to the outside world as a big bluff. Their real reaction to the new threat indicated fear and panic over the new weapon, especially on the part of Americans. The High Command of the Allied General Staff, based in Bushy Park in the London suburb of Streatham, was dismayed. As the Commander-in-Chief of the US Air Force, General ARNOLD, wrote: "This means unrest and dismay and may even lead to the collapse of all normal life in England." HITLER could be to regain the initiative. Maj . Gen. BEDELL SMITH, General EISENHOWER's chief of staff, was assigned to see whether headquarters should move out of Bushy Park because of the V-1 threat and move to Portsmouth to be safe from the V-1 . Portsmouth, however, did not have the necessary communications facilities, and so the top command of the General Staff remained in London. One wonders how General EISENHOWER knew that Portsmouth, which was also within range of the V-1s, was not to be fired with V-1s.

Day after day the V-1s were falling on London, and the German command had announced an intensification of the shelling.

The main concern of the Allied supreme commanders was what would happen if, instead of bombing London, the Germans used their robotic bombs against the Anglo-American landing fleet

Allied Headquarters in
Bushy Park, London.
Seated from left: Bernard
MONTGOMERY, Dwight
EISENHOWER and
Arthur N. TETER.
Standing: Walter BEDELL
SMITH, Trafford LEIGH
MALLORY, Bertram H.
RAMSEY and Omar N.
BRADLEY.



the artificial harbors called "Mulberrys," and against the shores would direct the fleet's shelling formations. Then the loss of 50 percent of the fleet would be expected, and this would have dire consequences if the US fleet shared in the losses. HITLER was aware of this, he declared even before the invasion began: "The Allies cannot cope with the loss of 5-6 battleships."

Although HITLER was aware of the V-1's ability to destroy the Allied invasion potential, he still fired exclusively at London. Some authors probably consider it one of the biggest secrets of the Second World War what prompted HITLER to do it. This seems all the more puzzling since the German leadership had had a report from General HEINEMANN since January 1944, who as commander was concerned with operational planning and the possibilities of the new retaliatory weapons. It was clear from his unchallenged statements months before the V-1s began to be deployed that a victorious conventional "V-Hail of Weapons" was not within the scope of the German possibilities.

So there must have been something else that made HITLER his led wrong decision.^{1,2}

Why weren't the V-weapons allowed to be used against the invasion?

There are numerous indications that the use of the V-1 and V-2 would have been possible much earlier.³

While the operational batteries of the V-weapons had been moved to France since the autumn of 1943, an almost unbelievable chain of delays – from the production of enough missiles and rockets to the construction of the launch pads – led to the attack date being constantly postponed.

The fact remains that the use of the two V-weapons could have been technically and organizationally implemented months before the start of the Allied invasion in June 1944.

The first use of the V-2 from France was already planned for January 15, 1944. Above all, the lack of 'training rockets' prevented this until September 1944!

Finally, on May 16, 1944, HITLER had stipulated that the long-distance bombardment of London should begin in mid-June 1944. At the beginning of the invasion, the V-1 unit Flaregiment 155 (W) was already at 1:30

1 Gerd SUDHOLT and Franz KUROWSKI, *That was the Second World War. 1944*, Druffel, Berg 1994, p. 298 ff.

2 Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Victory Weapons*, Vol. 2a: *Star wars 1947. From the V-1 to the A-9: Unconventional short and medium-range weapons*, Amun, Schleusingen 2003, p. 33 ff. 41-46.


3 Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Victory Weapons*, Vol. 2a: *Star Wars 1947. From the V-1 to the A-9: Unconventional short and medium-range weapons*, Amun, Schleusingen 2003, pp. 34 ff., 54-59 and 41-53.

informed by telephone of the start of the invasion at night. In the afternoon of the same day, at about 5:45 p.m., the regiment was given the 'lumber room' order, so that the final six days of irreversible preparations for the bombing of London by unmanned Fi 103 aircraft were to begin.


That night the first of the heavy star catapult guns was hauled out of the field ammunition stores in the Reich and loaded for transport to the French launch sites, where the foundations had been waiting for them for months.

Finally, eight days after the start of the invasion, the first V-1 exploded in the English capital. This was the beginning of a merciless terror campaign against London.

To this day there is debate as to why the Fi 103 was not used against the invasion ports and the Allied bridgehead in Normandy. On November 13, 1943, HITLER had made it clear during a conversation with KEITEL, MILCH, JODL and SPEER that he did not see the main purpose of the Fi 103 in its use as a mass weapon to ward off the threatening invasion fleet. As the general of



Fieseler Fi 103 (V-1) and EMWA-4 (V-2) in 1944 livery. Over 8,000 V-1s were launched against London from June to September 1944 – none flew against the landing troops in Normandy. The V-2 was not yet in action during the invasion battle. Both "vengeance weapons" could have posed a threat to the Allied landing.



Anti-aircraft artillery AXTHELM criticized the German aerial bomb production program and declared that it was only a tenth of what would be necessary to defeat the Allied invasion preparations, he was angrily interrupted by HITLER : "Don't concern yourself with defending against the invasion; and confine yourself to the topic of retaliation!" HITLER concluded with the words: »First shoot over there, then you will also get the necessary ammunition!«

With this, HITLER made it clear that the use of aerial bombs against England with the Fi 103 was a large-scale troop experiment that was later to be followed by the necessary (war-decisive) ammunition. In March 1944 he had made it clear to Colonel Hans-Ulrich RUDEL that the effectiveness of the current V-weapons should not be overestimated because the accuracy of the projectiles was still very low. That wouldn't be so important now, though, because all he wants right now is missiles that fly properly. Later, normal explosives would not come into consideration, as they are at the moment, but something else that would be so powerful that the positive war decision would then be made at that point at the latest. The development for this is already well advanced and the final completion is to be expected soon. RUDEL later heard that the explosive effect of this weapon was supposed to be based on atomic forces. When it came to counter-invasion defenses in June 1944, only conventionally armed Fi 103s were used.

Soon after the landing, Marshals ROMMEL and VON RUNDSTEDT demanded that the retaliatory weapons no longer be used exclusively against London, but also against the bridgeheads in France and the Allied supply ports.

HITLER and JODL dealt with this question at their conference in Margival on June 17, 1944. When asked by General der Artillerie Erich HEINEMANN, the commander of the VI in Normandy, he is said to have testified at the conference that the V-weapons were not could be used as tactical weapons against the bridgehead, since their accuracy of 15 to 18 km from the target point was far too great to be able to use them successfully against the then rather limited Allied sphere of influence in France without endangering their own troops

When ROMMEL and VON RUNDSTEDT then demanded at least one use of the V-weapon against the port cities in southern England, HITLER also vetoed this idea. Instead, he hoped that concentrating on the major goal of London would have a decisive effect. England should do so either for peace

1 Samuel W. MITCHAM Jr.,
The Desert Fox in Normandy
(Cooper Square 2001), pp.
120 f.

to prevent his capital from being taken out, or allow the Allies to be tempted into launching a second invasion of the Pas-de-Calais. Fed by their own secret service with false numbers about the Allied forces in England, they hoped to be able to break the neck of a second landing in the Pas-de-Calais. In fact, on June 11, 1944, the English Minister of the Interior, Herbert MORRISON, also demanded a second invasion of the Pas-de-Calais. However, by that time the Allied forces had already landed in Normandy, and there was no way at that time to undertake a second invasion, even if one had wanted to.

A change of target undertaken on June 27, 1944 at the V-Weapons Regiment's own initiative against the large port of embarkation for invasion supplies in Southampton was categorically forbidden by the High Command of the Commander-in-Chief West the very next day allowed, which could disrupt the invasion.

In fact, according to Allied information, the VI could have been decisive in the post-war period had it been used in good time. The invasion could have been thwarted by continuous fire on the embarkation ports. Fearing an Fi 103 fire at the critical moment during the planned landing on the continent, the Allies considered in February 1944 to postpone their preparations for the invasion. to the west of Britain - out of range of the German aerial bombs.

In the summer of 1944, the aerial bomb was demoted exclusively to a political weapon of terror. There is evidence that until September 1944 HITLER was deliberately deceived into imminent annihilation of London by the VI to prevent their use on the Normandy front. It was suggested to HITLER that the moment was not far off when England, worn down by Germany's retaliatory weapons, would plead for peace.

Ironically, as a response to the attack on Adolf HITLER on July 20, the VI became one of the means by which the English, through continuous fire, announced that the Germans intended to continue the war.

If one believes modern knowledge, it is doubtful whether General HEINEMANN in Margival really took the view that VI would endanger one's own troops when deployed in the invasion area. On the contrary, HEINEMANN advised launching the VI to shell the invasion fleet. He gave an impressive lecture

maintained, but HITLER did not want to commit himself. Instead, the Fuhrer offered VON RUNDSTEDT and ROMMEL to direct the aerial bombs on the invading troops six weeks later. As long as Normandy was to be held.¹

¹ Bernhard ZÜRNER, *Hitler. General against his will?*, Vo winckel, Stegen 2001, p. 335 f.

Unfortunately, it never became known what HITLER expected from it. Should it be clear by August 1944 whether the Fi 103 could, as promised, eliminate London and lure the Allies into a second invasion in the Pas de Calais, or had the German command by then had new warheads (ABC?) for the retaliatory weapons ver spoke, from which HITLER then hoped for a victory against the invasion?

We will probably never know the full truth. In fact, until the capture of the V-1 launch pads at Pas-de-Calais in September 1944, the Londoners alone had to endure the force of the V-1 attacks, apart from the few shots fired at Southampton.

Not a single one was fired at the invading forces in France.

The dreaded V-2 was not used until September 8, 1944, when the decision in France had long been made.

General EISENHOWER confirmed that the retaliatory weapons could have played a crucial role in repelling the invasion.

He wrote: 'I am convinced that if the enemy had been able to use these weapons for six months, Operation Overlord would have been lost. Especially if he had made the Portsmouth and Southampton area one of his main targets.'

What happened in Nancy on July 7, 1944?

At the beginning of July 1944, did the Germans give up their intention to use "special weapons" against the landing troops?

On July 7, 1944 happened in Nancy, so still far behind the fighting front, an event that remains a mystery to this day.^{2, 3}


Although German cargo glider missions in the West hardly seemed more feasible due to the Allied air superiority, that day three five-engine Heinkel He 111 Z towing aircraft of the 4./LLG2 towed six Gotha Go 242 cargo gliders loaded with "special ammunition" from Nancy to Wittstock / Dos se, in order "not to let them fall into enemy territory". The justification is not convincing, because the Nancy location was far from the

² Georg SCHLAUG, *The German Cargo Glider Associations 1937/ 45,*

Motorbuch, Stuttgart 1985

³ Manfred GRIEHL, *Heinkel He 111*, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 1997, p. 239.

Gotha Go 242
B cargo gliders
were loaded with
a mysterious
payload on July 7,
1944 (model
reconstruction GEORG)




front removed, and even then there was no threat of a breakthrough by the Allies.

The return transport of the "special ammunition" must have been important ammunition, because night towing flights with two Go 242s had been practiced intensively for this special operation. When the time came, however, the transport was then flown in daylight, even though 750 US fighters were operating in central German airspace on that day. However, as in a slalom run, the pilots of the He 111 Z managed to use every cumulus cloud to avoid being spotted.

Why was it not flown at night as originally planned and practiced? Was another sabotage order at work here, or were they afraid that the planned return transport by night had already been betrayed to the Allies, and were they therefore taking a risk?

The way it was transported back allows important conclusions to be drawn about the cargo: the 'special ammunition' from Nancy must have been very heavy and bulky because it could not be taken on board normal transport aircraft (eg Ju 352, He 111). The Go 242, on the other hand, as a heavy-duty glider, was able to load even VW "Kübelwagen" cars. At the same time, the return transport obviously had to be carried out quickly, so that transport by road or rail on the Allied Air Forces was difficult



operational in 1944?

Radiological 1000 kg
isotope parachute bomb
on trailer with VW

"Kübelwagen" (reconstruction
after BROOKS, model
GEORG)

overland transport routes appeared to be more dangerous than an equally risky cargo glider flight.

The July 7 flight was not carried out spontaneously, but thoroughly prepared (e.g. night flight training).

So it must have been about something special, what's on the could not be transported overland.

It is known that the Germans in France were also prepared to use poison gas, whereby the nerve gas 'Tabun', which was still unknown to the Allies, would also have been used. So exist th z. For example, in the summer of 1944, two storage and service facilities for VI gas warheads were hewn into the rock near Monterollier.

During the war, however, the German poison gas supplies were transported by normal land routes until May 1945, so that a transport of special gas ammunition on July 7, 1944 seems very unlikely.

The situation is different if one considers radiological isotope charges or early forms of nuclear warheads as "special ammunition":¹ Germany's radiological bombs weighed 250 to 1000 kg and had to be transported in

protective containers because of their dangerous radiation. Here speed of transport would have been a prime requirement, and so there is an interesting possibility that


¹ Friedrich GEORG,
Hitler's weapons of
victory, Vol. 1: *Secret
nuclear weapons of the*

*Third Reich and their
carrier systems*, Amun,
Schleusingen 2000, pp.

on July 7, 1944, six isotope bombs were withdrawn from France.

If this theory is correct, the question arises as to whether this was done on Hitler's orders (he rejected the radiological weapon as well as gas for the first strike) or whether other high-ranking personalities finally prevented the possibility of a later use against the Western Allies in Normandy wanted to.

The truth may still lie dormant in some vault the USA, England or Russia.



Chapter 6

How everything fits together

CHURCHILL goes ashore.
He ultimately advocated a landing
on the Normandy coast.

Dept. 1: The real reasons for the decision to land

"A colossal gamble!" (US intelligence chief Bill DONOVAN on the prospects of success of the planned invasion)¹

"Operation Bloodbath"

The Allied plans for the 'liberation of Europe from the German yoke' envisaged the largest seaborne invasion that had ever taken place. However, it contained enormous dangers and an enormous risk of failure, so that high-ranking English officials in 1943 jokingly and macabre referred to it as "Operation Bloodbath".² In the spring of 1944, many high-ranking American and British Air Force commanders such as General SPAATZ and Marshall HARRIS firmly believed that an invasion of Western Europe was unnecessary.^{3, 4}

In fact, many Allied diplomats, politicians and the military had doubts about the success of the project until the start of the landing.

Thus, CHURCHILL'S military adviser, Field Marshal Sir Alan BROOKE, wrote that he was very uncomfortable planning the operation. The Allied planning staff had therefore decided to hold a major maneuver on the south Devon coast at the end of April 1944. Here the beaches resembled those of Normandy. The dress rehearsal, however, failed completely. the



¹ Christoph MAUCH, *Shadow war against Hitler. The Third Reich in the sights of American intelligence services 1941-45*, DVA, Stuttgart 1999, p. 233.

² Shelford BIDWELL et al., *Land Warfare in the 20th Century*, Gondrome 1978, p. 1.

³ David METS, *Master of Airpower: General Carl D. Spaatz*, Presidio Press 1988, p. 20.

⁴ Haywood HANSELL, *The Air Plan that defeated Hitler*, Longino and Porter 1972, pp. 273-277.

In April 1944, at Slapton Sands in Devon, where the beaches resemble those in Normandy, one of the most extensive landing exercises ('Exercise Tiger') began, in which 23,000 US soldiers took part. Here landing craft approach the beach. The exercise was in no way satisfactory.

Naval artillery fired maneuver ammunition at friendly troops, misplaced troops wandered about, and complete chaos ensued when vehicles and soldiers landed in the wrong order. To make matters worse, HITLER had learned about the major maneuvers from German agents in England. German Schnellboote set a bloody beacon for the whole dress rehearsal when they ventured onto the English coast and wreaked havoc under the Allies' valuable LST (Landing Ship Tank) reserve without suffering any casualties.

1 Klaus WIEGREFFE, "Victory at any price", in: *Der Spiegel*, no. 23/29. 5. 2004, p. 64.

After the failure of the large-scale exercise, the US Chief of Staff, General Walter BEDELL SMITH, estimated the chances of holding the planned bridgehead in Normandy at only 50 percent.¹

Even the Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Dwight EISENHOWER, did not want to rule out the failure of the meticulously planned landing. On June 6, 1944, he already had a personal statement in his uniform pocket that his press officer Col. E. DUPY was to read out in the event of failure.² In the event of an Allied defeat, a successor to General EISENHOWER was carefully prepared.

2 EISENHOWER's text read: 'Our landings in the Cherbourg-Le Havre area have not been to a satisfactory extent able to gain a foothold, and I have therefore withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this point at this point was based on the best information available. The army, air force and navy have done what bravery and faithful performance of duty can only ever do. Should there be an error somewhere during the landing attempt, I alone am responsible

It never became known whether the Allied High Command would have carried out the landing maneuvers in Normandy as planned if they had learned that the Germans had already found precise information about the place and time of the landing.

It was a bad omen that the British knew from Ultra deciphering that HITLER had been expecting an invasion on the Normandy coast since the spring of 1944 and was feverishly holding on to reinforcing this stretch of coast.

Why Winston CHURCHILL changed his mind

On May 4, 2005, just a few days before the 60th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe, Valentin FALIN in *Die Welt* accused the Western Allies of deliberately delaying their landing in France by years.³ The former top Soviet functionary, ambassador to of the Federal Republic from 1971 to 1978 and precursor of Mikhail GORBACHEV, concluded that a timely opening of the "Second Front" could have saved millions of human lives. Is there more than a spark of truth behind FALIN's provocative thesis?

word.«

3 Valentin FAUN, "War end 1943?", in: *Die Welt*, May 4, 2005, p. 9.

For years, Winston CHURCHILL was a bitter opponent of the landings in France. He was embittered for the strategic promise of success

Appropriate solution to use the allied invasion troops in the Balkans. Until well into 1943, the British Prime Minister was of the opinion that crossing the English Channel in spring 1944 was out of the question, unless Germany was already collapsing by that time. In July 1943, however, he had already accepted the French solution and was increasingly becoming a staunch supporter of a landing in France. When there were bitter discussions among the Allies in the spring of 1944 because of the threat of the use of German weapons against the Allied invasion ports, because of the massive supply problems for landing craft and the unconvincing dress rehearsals of the landing, it was Sir Winston CHURCHILL who, in the eventful and turbulent deliberations of the Western Allies before the start of the invasion because he knew of terrible things that were about to become available to the Germans. But then everything will be too late.¹ Was this the real reason for the Allied landings in France?

1 "How many atomic bombs did Hitler have", in: *Grazer Saturday*, February 11, 1956/No. 6

Balkans or France: The difficult alternative becomes the goal

In fact, the Allies fought bitterly for a long time over the location of the new 'Second Front'². The Russians preferred France. The Resistance there was heavily influenced by communism, and by the time the Anglo-Americans had fought their way eastward from there, the Soviet army could advance well into Central Europe. STALIN 's goal was a communist-ruled 'liberated' France and an advance of the Red Army to the Rhine. In fact, there were attempts in 1944, influenced by the communists, to push back the date of the invasion through massive strikes in England. This failed.

2 The much-vaunted »Second Front« was actually the fourth front for the Third Reich after Russia (eastern front), Italy (southern front) and the Balkans (southern front)

CHURCHILL long preferred the Balkans as an invasion site for opposite reasons. An advance by the Western powers could have prevented the Red Army from advancing further west and the Western Allies would have suffered fewer losses among their own soldiers, because there was no Atlantic Wall there and only a few German occupation troops.

US President ROOSEVELT , seemingly indifferent to the fate of Europe, sided with the Russians, and the Allies decided to land in northern France.

In fact, it only looked like that at first glance! The Normans the invasion might have been the bloodier solution, and it wasn't

sure if they would end the war faster than a landing in the Balkans. But it had one advantage that convinced the coolly calculating Americans: Only by landing in France as quickly as possible could one hope to prevent a German weapons development that threatened to jeopardize everything the Western Allies had achieved so far. The British, too, eventually realized that a Balkan invasion would be a worse way of dealing with this great danger.

To this day, no importance is attached to the real reason why the Western Allies took the great risk of landing in France, although one of the top US generals publicly announced this as early as 1945.

In fact, after landing, English officers were warned that French residents were so vengeful for the manner in which they had been liberated that they took every opportunity to ambush their liberators


1 Elmar HEINZ, »Second Front«, in: *DWS*, June 6, 2005, p. 86.

General MARSHALL reveals the true background of the landing

2 *The New York Times*, October 10, 1945, "Text of the Report of General Marshall," pp. 1-12.

3 *The Times*, 10.10. 1945, p. 1.

On October 10 , 1945, General George C. MARSHALL 's official report to the American Secretary of War appeared in the press.^{2,3} In this official concluding remarks on the Western Allied war effort, the Chief of Staff also addressed the Normandy invasion.




Front page of General MARSHALL's official report.

MARSHALL wrote: "Victory in this global war depended on the successful execution of 'Overlord' (the Allied Normandy landings - editor's note). It must not fail... The invasion of France had to take place in 1944 in order to shorten the war by facilitating the westward advance of Soviet forces. At the same time, German advances in technology, for example in the development of nuclear weapons, forced us to attack before those terrible weapons were used against us.'

The Americans, MARSHALL went on to write, had achieved their nuclear weapons only through a combination of luck, good management and constant effort. German advances in the same direction had been a constant concern of the Allies and one of the factors that made the western invasion a

unalterable absolute necessity. The sudden rush with which the Allies pushed ahead with their Normandy invasion from 1943 is now understandable.

The widespread claim that development of a German atomic bomb was halted in the summer of 1942 belongs in the dustbin of history! Was their prevention the real reason for the invasion?



(abombs.jpg) »German WW II Atom Bombs« (Igor SHESTAKOV) German World War II atomic bombs1

from top to bottom:

Heinkel He 111 A-5 V-38 with uranium bomb

Heinkel He 111 A-5 ›Atlantic bombs with SA-4000

Isotope bomb and BV 40 Gasoline towing tank

Horten Ho XVIII AV-1 with uranium bomb

Horten Ho XVIII B with plutonium bomb

Ju 87 D-7

“Nachtschlachtflugzeug” (SO) with a small uranium bomb

Me109 K-4(SO) with smaller uranium bomb

BV destroyer project with small uranium bomb

1 Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Victory Weapons*, Vol. 1, Amun, Schleusingen 2000.

The Normandy Invasion and the Murray Hill Area Plan

1 Valentin FALIN, *Second Front, The Conflicts of Interest of the Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Knauf, Munich 1997, p. 405.

The Normandy invasion must be seen in the context of the super-secret US Murray Hill Area plan, enacted in 1943. It envisaged finding all the world's deposits and sources of fissile material and turning them into US possession in order to guarantee the American nuclear monopoly. Dominance in world finance, international civil aviation, and shipping are beyond the scope of this book and require separate study.

The fact was that in 1943/44 the majority of the world's known uranium reserves (Union Minière, Auergesellschaft) were located in the heartland of the German Reich as well as in Belgium and Czechoslovakia. It was important to capture these supplies as quickly as possible before the Russians.

It was also known that V-weapons were being built up in France with great haste to be used against England and the USA.² The fear of some Allied scientists that these V-weapons could serve as carriers for nuclear weapons turned out to be all too justified at the end of the war.

After the successful invasion, General Leslie Groves was able to announce to the American Secretary of War in September 1944 that by the end of the war the USA would have direct or indirect possession of nine-tenths of all deposits with a high uranium ore content. This makes it clear why EISENHOWER landed in Normandy.

It was mostly military, economic and technological interests that are to be seen as the actual reasons for the 'liberation of Europe'.

Uncomfortable Truths: The 'Stalin Factor' and the 'Liberation of Europe'

In addition to fear of the German atomic bomb, the Western Allies were also suspicious of the Soviet side. For years, STALIN had been pushing for a second front to be built in the west to relieve the pressure on the eastern front. In the spring of 1944, however, the situation on the Eastern Front had changed so much that STALIN was no longer in a hurry. On the contrary: the longer the Western Allies were held in check by the German Wehrmacht on the Atlantic coast, the sooner he was able to achieve his goals in Eastern, Central and Southern Europe.

2 Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Victory Weapons*, Vol. 2: *Star Wars 1947*, Part A: From the V-1 to the A-9, Amun, Schleusingen 2003; Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Siegewaffe*, Vol. 2: *Star wars 1947*, Part B: From the 'America rocket' to the orbital station, Amun, Schleusingen 2004.

It is particularly important here that at the time the Allies marched into France there were still no concrete agreements between America, England and Russia on how to occupy Germany after its capitulation.¹ Here lay the opportunities and risks for the individual Allies. A rapid collapse of Germany could lead to the triumph of one side or the other. Apparently, STALIN had also tried to paralyze the strategically important energy supply industry with a massive wave of strikes in England. He knew it wouldn't stop the invasion, but it would delay it. In fact, on April 28, 1944, the British Minister for Labor, Ernest BEVIN, spoke of mysterious influences connected with strikes in Great Britain endangering the "Second Front" and of this country's right to govern itself, not by someone from outside, to be governed.² It was clear that this did not mean the Third Reich and that the strikers could hardly be described as HITLER sympathizers.

¹ Valentin FAUN, *Second Front. The Conflicts of Interest of the Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Knauer, Munich, Munich 1997, pp. 436 and 454.

² Janusz PIEKALKIEWICZ, *Invasion. France 1944*, Südwest, Munich 1979, p. 100.

Here, too, there was reason to act quickly.

General MARSHALL wrote in his official report dated

October 1945 that the Normandy invasion had been undertaken to facilitate a Soviet advance into Europe. He should have added that the invasion had to be undertaken quickly precisely because of the threatening Soviet advance into the heart of Europe. The beginning of the ›Cold War‹ cast its shadow.

The ›liberation of the population‹ was secondary, in contrast to what is publicly portrayed today.

Investigations in French communities also revealed that more than 3,000 French civilians lost their lives as a result of the massive bombardment of the Normandy coastal region that began at 12:30 am on June 6th. "Collateral damage" would probably be *what ›CNN‹ or ›Fox News‹ would call it today*.

This was also seen by those affected. Thus wrote the Chief of the British General Staff, Sir Alan BROOKE, who had traveled to Normandy on June 12 to meet EISENHOWER: 'I was surprised how little the country had suffered under German occupation and five years of war. The French people do not seem at all pleased that we are coming as a victorious army to liberate France. She was quite content before, and we are bringing war and destruction to her land.'³ Full of anger

³ Heinz SCHMOLKE, *The War Decision. The Treason in Normandy 1944*, Historia, Horb 2004, p. 100.

French ›liberated‹ often carried out nightly attacks on individual Allied soldiers.

1 Philippe GAUTIER,
*Deutschenangst,
Deutschenhaß*, Grabert,
Tübingen, 1999, p. 11.

The Frenchman Philippe GAUTIER, who 'experienced' the Allied air raids on Caen and Le Havre as a child, writes:¹ 'In the city of Saint-Lô, which was 90 percent destroyed, there weren't many people left to greet our 'liberators'. to cheer Hundreds had been rescued by the Germans who had taken them into their bunker. Could one ask others—dead, wounded, amputees—to stand up and merrily wave Union Jack flags or little star banners? When the first Canadians marched into Caen, which had been infinitely more plagued than Paris, they were spat in the face by the French, and in the port city of Le Havre, deliberately burned with phosphorus bombs, the British saw flags half-flying on the windows of the houses still standing masts, which were sometimes provided with a crape.'

What would have happened if the invasion had failed?

HITLER had recognized the importance of repelling the invasion for the German cause. To achieve this, he staked everything on one card: by the turn of the year 1943/44, the German armored divisions in the Ukraine had been bled dry. There were no replacements, since a large part of German production went to the West to ward off an Allied landing. After a defensive victory, they should be moved back to the east. The fate of the Eastern Front thus depended on the invasion.

A failure of the Anglo-American Channel crossing would certainly have had far-reaching consequences. Both warring factions were fully aware of this. HITLER and the German high command were positively awaiting the large-scale attack by the Western Allies, firmly convinced that the landing would fail. Grand Admiral DÖNITZ informed the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, Baron OSHIMA, that Germany would wait another two or three months for the invasion and that if it did not come they would attack, transfer strong reserves to the eastern front and counter the enemy in the West would proceed by other means. It was clear to Baron OSHIMA that these "other means" were referred to as "weapons of revenge."² The Third Reich would then take its time to complete and deploy its weapons of revenge and victory.

2 Bruce LEE, *Marching Orders. The untold story of World War*, Da Capo 1995, pp. 203 and 209.

After an unsuccessful crossing of the Channel, the Anglo-Americans would not have attempted a new landing for several years

can search. On the domestic stage, ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL would most likely have encountered major domestic political difficulties, while resistance to HITLER in German military circles would have had no chance after such a successful defense. On the large political level, the alliance between the western powers and the Soviet Union would then have been extremely endangered, whereas Germany might have gained new allies.

In such a case, STALIN had already threatened the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the war.

Unlike in 1940, however, the Third Reich had no forces this time had more to cross over to England after the Anglo-Americans had been expelled, although landing pontoons were still stored in supply depots in France, which were then actually delivered to SS units in the middle of the Normandy Battle.

A failed invasion attempt in June 1944 would have turned the course of the war completely upside down. The possibilities here range from a separate peace between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union (negotiations in Stockholm¹ in the summer of 1944), the advance of Soviet troops to the Atlantic in the event of a complete German defeat in the East, to the use of the German victorious weapons with a Victory over the Allies in East and West. The scheduled deployment date for these weapons was summer/autumn 1945.

¹ See: Hans MEISER, *Failed Peace Initiatives 1939-45*, Grabert, Tübingen 2004, pp. 247-260.

When the secrets of the German armaments workshops were revealed after the German collapse, Senator ED THOMAS, Chairman of the Senate Commission on Military Affairs:² "If our invasion had had to be postponed by just six months, the Germans would have had superiority not only in Europe, but also across the Channel and England... Even if the Germans had not invaded had carried it out - but they probably would have done it after all - an unconditional, non-negotiating peace would have been our last resort. We had only a narrow way of ending the war in time.«

² Quoted in: Peter KLEIST, *You were there too, Vo winckel*, Loni 1952, p. 363.

Armageddon: If

the landings in France had not taken place until 1945... In 1945 the

Allies would have had to face off against a whole arsenal of new types of anti-invasion weapons. These included the 28 cm DKM 44 jet cannon of the Kriegsmarine. A copy was found


1 Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's*
Victory Weapons, Vol. 1,
 Amun, Schleusingen 2000, p. 171 ff.

2 *Berliner Zeitung*,
Wissenschaft – »The fear was
there, and it was justified«,
July 28, 2005,
[www.berlinonline.de/berliner-
zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/
2005/0728/wissenschaft/0008/
index.html](http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2005/0728/wissenschaft/0008/index.html)

3 Renato VESCO and David
Hatcher CHILDRESS, *Man
Made UFOS 1944-1994*,
AUP 1994, p. 159 f.

Henschel HS 1 32 A 'anti-invasion aircraft' with liquid air/coal dust bomb to produce a large-scale explosion.

being tested at the end of the war. It later became the model for the US Army's 28 cm T-131 nuclear cannon. It is probably no coincidence that there is a similarity between the 28 cm nuclear ammunition of the American T 131 and German developments.¹ In 1946, the Soviet Minister of Munitions, Boris VANNIKOV, wrote in a report on the transfer of German nuclear technology to Russia from nuclear grenades on which German scientists were researching According to British post-war information, each shell was supposed to contain 750 grams of "disintegrating explosive".



Plan of 28 cm
jet gun
DKM 44 on
›Panther‹ chassis
(log principle)

Dept. 2: Was there a threat to the USA at the time of the invasion?

How the Allies were alerted to the impending danger in 1943


There is a close temporal connection between the Allied invasion decision and secret reports about HITLER's bomb.

During the Second World War, the Allies were informed both about the decoding of German decoding machines (ENIGMA) and, through a large number of agents and high-ranking German traitors, about almost all the secrets of the Third Reich. This included the danger of the German atomic bomb.

In addition to the atomic spy Paul ROSBAUD and the spy Fritz KOLBE, it was the traitor from Peenemünde, Otto JOHN, who, as a Lufthansa syndic, reported to the Allies in Madrid in the autumn of 1943 that the production of an atomic bomb on paper was complete. For technical reasons, however, fabrication cannot yet be accomplished.

Alarmed, the Allies had found out beforehand that the Japanese were looking for the delivery of uranium and pitchblende through their embassy in Berlin on July 7, 1943.¹

Through the decoding of the German and Japanese secret codes, the Allies were also aware that some of the 33 "Monsoon Group" submarines sailing from France and Norway to Japan were carrying uranium cargo for Japan's uranium enrichment project. Others carried an amalgam of mercury mixed with uranium in their keels, which were filled in 32 kg zinc bottles. In 1943, allied Italy's submarines Giuliani and Torrelli, which ran from Bordeaux to Singapore with secret cargo, were even involved in these operations.² On July 15, 1943, OSS agent Allan DULLES from Switzerland had in one Telegram to his boss, Bill DONOVAN, reporting simultaneous nuclear research and missile activities in Peenemünde.³ All the alarm bells were now ringing at the responsible Allied authorities. HITLER's bombs could only be prevented by taking away the operational bases and occupying Germany - no matter what the cost! This was only possible through a direct invasion of Western Europe. The time of waiting for a German collapse was over.



From top: Allan DULLES and
OSS chief Bill DONOVAN

¹ Simon CUNSON, mail to the author of January 20, 2004.

² Ranieri MELONI, mail to the author of January 20, 2004.

³ Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Siegeswaffe*, Vol. 1: *Secret nuclear weapons of the Third Reich and their carrier systems*, Amun, Schleusingen 1998, p. 24

Nuclear test in the Baltic Sea in the spring of 1944: Around April 31 On March 31, an A-bomb


mounted on a pontoon was towed out to sea by a tugboat and unsuccessfully detonated in the presence of the Navy's scientific command staff. A

similar test is said to have been attempted off Neuwerk in the North Sea in 1943 (Thomas MEHNER, information to the author dated September 30, 2004).¹

In fact, the Allied decision to invade was not a second too soon. There had already been unsuccessful atomic bomb tests on March 31, 1944 in the Baltic Sea, presumably due to fuze problems.

But already on July 2, 1944 there were two under Dr. Ing. SEUFFERT (SS) and Dr. DIEBNER (Wehrmacht) working groups of scientists succeeded in completing the prototype of a functional A-weapon in a Thuringian test facility for technical nuclear experiments.

On August 5, 1944, HITLER was able to explain to the Rumanian Marshal ANTONESCU that German work on "new explosives" had reached the experimental stage. He added that, in his view, the leap from the explosives now in use to these new types of explosives was greater than that from black powder to the explosives that were in use when the war started. At that time, however, the decisive breakthrough battles were already taking place in France, which heralded the victory of the invasion.



»Destination New York«


Was the Normandy invasion supposed to protect the US from retaliatory German weapons attacks?

Single bomb attacks on the east coast city of New York were possible from France as early as June 1944.^{2, 3} The order for this was never issued.


¹ See also: Rainer KARLSCH, *Hitlers Bombe*, DVA, Munich 2004, p. 171.

² Manfred GRIEHL, *Luftwaffe over America. The Street Plans to Bomb the United States in World War II*, Greenhill 2004, pp. 146 ff., 156 fu 237.


³ Friedrich GEORG, *Hitler's Victory Weapons*, Vol. 1, Amun, Schleusingen 2001, pp. 29 fu 39-47.




A) Large flying boat Blohm & Voss BV 222 C-07 with 2 x SA-4000 "isotope bombs". Starting from the Bisca Rosse base, the flying boat should have been refueled by a submarine on the Atlantic and provided with its bomb load. Target points should be the Jewish quarter of New York. The weather conditions necessary for the stopover meant that the flying boats could be used for the period between March and September.



B) Puzzling: At the beginning of 1944, the Germans carried out a test flight with Ju 390s from Mont-de-Marsan up to 20 kilometers from New York. Experts are still bitterly arguing about the circumstances of this flight, which the Allies only learned about after the invasion began. The photos of the US coast that witnesses said they had brought with them have disappeared to this day.



C) Junkers Ju 290 A-2 ›Seeadler‹ tanker aircraft.



D) Junkers Ju 290 A-4 ›Seeadler‹ remote bomber conversion with air refueling probe on the fuselage nose and two Henschel HS 293 guided bombs with ›Tabun‹ nerve gas filling. Four Ju 290 tanker/long-distance bomber aircraft were stationed in Mont-de-Marsan in the spring of 1944 and practiced missions over the Atlantic. After the invasion, they were recalled to the empire.

E) The A-10 rocket launchers from Wizernes were not quite finished yet. The "America Rocket" would have become operational in 1945.

Wizernes today.



Dept. 3: Was there a conspiracy by high-ranking German officers?

"You cannot, as a high-ranking military leader, demand of your soldiers the sacrifice of their lives for victory for years and then bring about defeat with your own hands." This was what Field Marshal Erich VON MANSTEIN said in 1949 during his controversial trial before a British military court in Hamburg .1 What did the most successful strategist of the German Wehrmacht during the Second World War want to imply with these words?

1 Eric OF
MANSTEIN,
LOST VICTORIES ,
Athenaeum, Bonn
1955, p. 318.

How did the Allies know so much about the German positions?

On June 8, 1944, SS soldiers captured a strange map from a downed Canadian tank. All German positions were marked on it down to the last detail. It even listed the individual machine gun positions.² The question arises as to whether this surprisingly detailed knowledge was obtained solely on the basis of information provided by French underground fighters from the Resistance or whether it was also a matter of treason

2 Samuel W. MITCHAM
Jr., *The Desert Fox in
Normandy* (Cooper
Square 2001), p. 108.

by other informants who wanted to ensure the success of the Allied landings. Should General MÜLLER have been right?

Soviet intelligence reveals the truth about the 'Second Front'

Especially in the first years after the Second World War there were repeated indications of oddities, sabotage and treachery in connection with the Normandy invasion. At the latest after the start of the discussion about German rearmament in the early 1950s, no one dared to ask whether there was a larger connection behind all these oddities.

It was as if the former wartime enemies, now united in NATO, were interested in growing grass over the events of 1944 that had claimed so many lives on both sides. When appointing the high general posts in NATO, the question could have been asked as to why they were given generals who had actively fought against the Anglo-Americans in Normandy, and not the Eastern Front commanders who had experience in fighting the potential enemy, the Soviet Union . There had to be something that made the Western Allies have unreserved confidence in generals like Hans SPEIDEL . From 1957 to 1964 this man, who as Chief of Staff of Army Group B led the resistance against the Allies in France under Field Marshals ROMMEL, VON KLUGE and MODEL , was NATO Commander-in-Chief in Europe.

After the end of the Cold War, many things changed.

Although so many years have now passed since the end of the Second World War and the former enemies have long since become allies or even friends, the British government, for example, announced that it would keep important documents from the war under lock and key until at least 2017. This suggests that the general public is still being kept secret about this period. An adviser to the US National Archives in Washington also indicated that the files on high-ranking NATO generals such as SPEIDEL were "cleansed" of key documents before they were returned to the Federal Republic of Germany.¹ After the partial opening of Russian archives that had previously been kept secret is a new interpretation many events of World War II

¹ David IRVING, *Battle for Europe. With the courage of desperation against the invasion of 1944*, DSZ, Munich 2004, p.

but now possible and necessary. This also includes the problem of the ›second front‹, the landing on the European continent.

The Soviet archives show that not only did there exist an anti-Soviet community of interests between Great Britain and the United States within the Allied coalition, but also that there was a powerful group of high-ranking German figures who were willing to support Western Allied military operations to prepare against the Third Reich and to take an active part in it support.

They saw the defeat and occupation of Germany as morally and politically necessary for the future of the nation. Likewise, the same officers recognized the demand for an unconditional surrender as justified. The group wanted to support even a total occupation of Germany with all the important resources at its disposal.

The great hope was that a quick Western Allied victory over the Third Reich would curtail or reduce Soviet influence.

However, it would be too easy to understand the 'Second Front' merely as a military-political action against the Soviet Union. The summer of 1944 was certainly the ideal time for the Western Allies to intervene on the continent, because after years of extermination between HITLER and STALIN , the balance was now tipping in favor of the Soviet Union.

Of greater importance, however, was for the US to get its hands on the new German weapons technologies before they could turn the war decisively in Germany's favour. This topic is also often taboo today.

If the Western Allies' decision to invade Normandy was based on the barely concealed desire to acquire German high technology in competition with the Soviet Union, the landing was in part a success for the Americans in terms of power and economic policy.

The leap of the US economy from a technologically conventional mass manufacturer to a high-tech superpower would hardly have been possible without the inventions and patents captured in Germany at the end of the war and the German scientists who were more or less gently "persuaded" to cooperate.

So let's look at how this came about.

Conference ›Quadrant‹

From August 19 to 24, 1943, the Quadrant conference took place in Quebec. Among others, Admirals William LEAHY and Ernest KING, Generals George MARSHALL and Henry ARNOLD for the USA and General Allan BROOKE, Admiral Doodley POUND and Air Force Marshall Charles PORTAL for Great Britain took part. They discussed the question of whether the Germans "would not help to drive back the Russians" when Anglo-American troops invaded Germany.¹ At that point at the latest, the secret services MI 5 and OSS considered it an extremely important field of to create the conditions for an unhindered invasion of the Western Allied troops in Germany. Achieving this goal now became the main focus of individual contacts with the German opposition, which the Western Allies intended to play as a fifth column.

Their ideal variant was a landing in which the commanders of the few Wehrmacht units stationed in the west were to hand over the keys to the cities and fortresses without a fight.

In fact, the serious setbacks on the Eastern Front in 1942-43, such as at Stalingrad and Kursk, had made many high-ranking German generals and marshals ponder what the future held.

In September 1943, the three high-ranking officers VON KLUGE and BECK met in OLBRICHT's apartment, where "generous political solutions" were being worked out. Von Kluge and others believed that if an agreement with the Anglo-Saxons was reached in good time, the eastern front on Poland's old eastern border could be stabilized and made impregnable. Since HITLER stood in the way of an agreement, the need to overthrow him was no longer trivialized. GOERDELER was tasked with making sure that the United States and Britain "did the right thing."

After the decision to invade: the Allied secret services look for support in the German military and opposition circles

Originally, the Allies wanted their ›Second Front‹ (landing in France) only open when the "weakening" of Germany was clear and the fighting power of the Wehrmacht had dwindled so much that the Anglo-American expeditionary army, as if walking on foot from

1 Valentin FAUN, *Zweite Front*, Knauer, Munich 1997, p. 394.



General of the Infantry
Friedrich OLBRICHT.

Atlantic could roll to Berlin. The Torch landing in North Africa, which did not go according to Anglo-American expectations, had already pointed out in 1942 the need for massive material superiority of the landing forces. But even with this superiority, invasions still posed an enormous risk to the aggressor, as the near-fiasco Allied landings at Salerno in Italy had shown.

In 1943, however, the Wehrmacht was still not in the state of weakness demanded by the Anglo-Americans, although HITLER's armies had already taken a terrible toll in blood.

The danger of a German atomic bomb, which became increasingly apparent from the summer of 1943, nevertheless forced the Allies to act. For years, the English in particular had delayed the opening of a 'second front' in France and had therefore gotten into serious trouble with their Russian ally STALIN. The generalissimo was concerned with relieving his eastern front. At the beginning of 1943, CHURCHILL had ruled out a landing in France itself for 1944, and now suddenly every week and every month until the invasion counted.

Then the Western Allies came up with a helpful idea to reduce the risk of a landing. Even before the war broke out, German military opposition like Colonel-General BECK and General OSTER had pushed themselves upon the British, but they hadn't been properly appreciated. This attitude should now be fundamentally changed.

A hidden clue for posterity? With regard to Operation Overlord, General MARSHALL's report of October 10, 1945 states that there had been " *many* other vital operations" to secure the endangered landing in Normandy. These are not explained in detail. Did this also include agreements with members of the opposition German secret service and military to paralyze German defense efforts?

Plan 'Rankin' is to end the war

The possibility of working with German militaries led the Allies to develop three plans, dubbed Rankin A, B, and C. Codes of conduct were drawn up for three different

different military-political scenarios in order to be able to react immediately to the new possibilities, depending on the case:

- ›Rankin-A‹: The Germans offer normal resistance and must be fought down.
- ›Rankin-B‹: German resistance is low, and the western front is partially opened voluntarily,
- ›Rankin-C‹: The Nazi regime breaks before or during the landing together.

Lists of trustworthy and willing Germans who were willing to cooperate and who could be of use to the troops of the western powers in the event of a rapid occupation of the Reich were compiled under the keyword ›Gerplan‹. Of course, the understandable goal was to be able to carry out the Rankin-B or Rankin-C plans.

The German-Allied secret negotiations are expanded As a consequence of their decision to land, the Western powers purposefully expanded their contacts with the German defense and other military personnel. The connections via the Vatican, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Spain, Portugal and Latin America continued to function smoothly. Couriers rushed back and forth between seas, major corporations and banks of the United States and Britain, and leading banks and corporations of the Third Reich.¹

In the course of 1943, the American military leadership had feared that the world war could drag on and that the European theater of war would find itself in a hopeless situation. The war of attrition and operations on the periphery (Africa, Italy) brought with them a substantial enlargement of the army, which the United States had to provide. Now, on top of everything else, the Normandy landings threatened, described by Winston CHURCHILL as the most difficult and complicated operation that had ever taken place.

¹ Valentin FAUN, *Second Front. The Conflicts of Interest of the Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Knauer, Munich 1997, pp. 350 f., 374 and 394.

Admiral Canaris paves the way

What role did the chief of German counterintelligence, Admiral CANARIS, play in contacts between the Allies and German officers?

As the highest-ranking chief of staff in the OKW and representative of KEITEL, the admiral had the most precise insight into the plans of the top management.

Admiral Wilhelm CANARIS
(left with hat) on one
of his numerous
trips to Spain.



The British secret service MI-5 had a solid base in the Third Reich. While London was still receiving information from department heads of the German counterintelligence in 1938 and 1939, Admiral CANARIS himself made direct contact with his English opponent ›C‹, Sir Stuart Graham MEN ZIE, the head of British reconnaissance, not later than December 1940, on. At the end of 1942, Admiral CANARIS sent "peace proposals" to the head of MI-5. They were discussed at a secret personal meeting between MENZIE and CANARIS, which took place on French territory. Direct links between the English and CANARIS have been set up in Mallorca.

CANARIS also maintained close contact with the American OSS. Rumors circulated among the employees of the OSS that OSS chief DONOVAN and CANARIS had met in Spain in March or April 1943 and again in Istanbul in late summer or early autumn. The invasion had to be prepared!

At the end of 1943/beginning of 1944, Admiral CANARIS became aware of the Allied plan to give the German generals and politicians a chance to give up the western front, which was newly emerging after an Allied landing, on their own initiative. General EISENHOWER's staff was named as a partner in discussing the full details of a separate cease fire.

In June 1944, ›C‹ received detailed information about the situation surrounding HITLER and the opposition's plans to get rid of the leader from his German counterpart, who had already been ousted.